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A RIDDLE OF SOLIDARITY: THE RELEASE OF ONE SOLIDARY OBLIGOR
Act 331 of 1984, effective January 1, 1985, amended and reenacted
Titles III and IV of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code.' One area
of the law affected by this revision concerns the riddle of solidarity
embodied in OA 2100, 2101, and 2203.2 When these articles were read
in conjunction with one another, they generated great confusion in our
courts.3
The confusion arose where a creditor, upon receiving the propor-
tionate share of one solidary obligor, renounced the solidarity in this
obligor's favor without expressly reserving the debt in solido against the
remaining obligors. Similar difficulties arose where the creditor granted
a partial remission of the debt in favor of one solidary obligor without
reserving his claim against the remaining obligors. In most cases, the
creditor's intention was to merely make a personal discharge as to one
of the solidary obligors, not to discharge the debt in its entirety. Lou-
isiana courts consistently held, however, that according to OA 2203,
the release of one solidary obligor operated to release all solidary obligors
in the absence of an express reservation by the creditor. This was based
upon the legal presumption that the creditor who discharged one solidary
obligor obviously sought to discharge the entire debt. As a result, the
riddle was: how could the obligee renounce solidarity in favor of one
solidary obligor and accept his partial performance, in accordance with
OA 2100 and 2101, without losing his right of action against the re-
maining solidary codebtors for the balance of the debt?
4
This confusion stems from the wording and substance of the old
articles.' OA 2100 and 2101 made no mention of the necessity of a
reservation where the creditor renounced solidarity and released one of
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1. Articles 1756-2291 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 [hereinafter cited as OA
(old articles)] were repealed and replaced by new articles 1756-2057 [hereinafter cited as
NA]; see 1984 La. Acts, No. 331, § 1.
2. Solidarity exists in solidary obligations, also called obligations in solido. See NA
1794 which restates the rule of OA 2091: "An obligation is solidary for the obligors
when each obligor is liable for the whole performance. A performance rendered by one
of the solidary obligors relieves the others of liability toward the obligee." See also I S.
Litvinoff, Obligations § 21, at 41, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
3. The text of these articles is set out in the text accompanying notes 29-37 infra.
4. For some cases where OA 2100 and 2101 should have applied, see, e.g., Fridge
v. Caruthers, 156 La. 746, 101 So. 128 (1924); Irwin v. Scribner, 15 La. Ann. 583 (1860);
compare Billeaudeau v. Lemoine, 386 So. 2d 1359 (La. 1980) (where the court applied
OA 2100 and later inconsistently applied OA 2203); Hemphill v. Strain, 371 So. 2d 1179
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Sly v. New Orleans T. & M. Ry., 142 So. 276 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1932).
5. For the text of these articles, see infra text accompanying notes 29-37.
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the solidary obligors. OA 2203, on the other hand, contained the blanket
assertion that in the absence of an express reservation, a discharge in
favor of one solidary obligor operated as a discharge of all the other
solidary obligors. The difficulty and uncertainty created by these articles
can be traced back to the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Irwin
v. Scribner.6
In Irwin, the plantiff brought an action against five tortfeasors
bound in solido for damages caused by a battery on the plantiff and
an injury to one of his slaves.7 Soon after the trial began, the plantiff
settled with two of the solidary obligors without expressly reserving his
rights against the others. 8 The court in Irwin stated:
The discharge of one debtor in solido . . . in general discharges
all the co-obligors, for the reason that there is but one debt,
although due by several; and hence, there can be but one sat-
isfaction of the same. In this class of obligations, the Code has
made an exception in the single case where the creditor, releasing
one of his debtors, has expressly reserved his right against the
other debtors in solido, and then he is obliged to credit the
other co-debtors with the amount so remitted. 9
Thus, the plantiff's claim against the three remaining solidary obligors
was dismissed. Neither the court nor the plantiff acknowledged articles
6. 15 La. Ann. 583 (1860).
7. Apparently, the court found that all five of the defendants were joint tortfeasors
bound in solido under Civil Code article 2304 (1825), which became Civil Code article
2324 (1870). See La. Civ. Code art. 2324 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 17 West's La. Stat. Ann.-
Civ. Code). Otherwise, the court would not have been able to justify the application of
articles concerning solidary obligors. The record is devoid of any reference to this issue.
8. The court's interpretation that the plantiff failed to reserve his rights in the
receipt is questionable. The receipt read:
Irwin v. Scribner et al.-No. 5951. In this case it is agreed that John Webb
and Theodore H. Scribner are to pay each eighty dollars, their share of the
costs accrued up to this date, and they are to pay this sum whether there be
judgment for or against defendant. And the plantiff pledges himself and hereby
promises to exact no more than the aforesaid sum from said Webb and Scribner,
under any circumstances; and should there be judgement against defendant for
damages, plantiff hereby remits all damages and additional costs which may be
recovered against the said Webb and Scribner.
It is not the intention of the parties to this agreement, to prejudice or favor
the trial against the other defendants, but merely to fix the amount required
of said Webb and Scribner, as all the defendants are supposed to be liable in
solido.
15 La. Ann. at 584. This receipt, read as a whole, is easily susceptible of an interpretation
that the plaintiff was merely dividing the debt in favor of these two solidary obligors in
order to receive a payment for their share. He intended to leave the balance of the debt
and the remaining obligors unaffected. The second paragraph of the receipt should have
satisfied the requirement of an express reservation.
9. 15 La. Ann. at 584.
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2096 and 2097 from the Civil Code of 1825, the predecessors to OA
2100 and 2101.10
In Fridge v. Caruthers," the plantiff pointed out to the court that,
"there is a conflict between article 2100 and article 2203, ' 112 and he
asked the court to follow 2100. To this end, the court replied:
If there be such a conflict, then it clearly behooves us to
choose which of the two articles we should follow; and having
once so chosen, consistency would then require us to adhere to
that choice, to the end that there may be some certainty about
the law on the subject.
But our predecessors have uniformly chosen to follow article
2203, and not article 2100.13
In each of these cases, the creditor's intention was to merely remit
the solidarity in favor of one solidary obligor and accept his payment,
while reserving the creditor's right against the other solidary debtors.
Under the proper interpretation of OA 2100 and 2101, these creditors
would have retained their rights without the necessity of an express
reservation. Instead, Louisiana courts have consistently chosen to apply
OA 2203 which operated to discharge all solidary obligors.14 When did
OA 2100 and 2101 apply? To solve this riddle we must consider the
two distinct principles which were encompassed by these former Code
provisions-renunciation of solidarity and remission of the debt.,5
Renunciation of Solidarity
The first of these, renunciation of solidarity or "conventional dis-
charge," is in essence the division of the debt. 6 Where the creditor
renounces solidarity as to all of the debtors, the solidarity is extinguished
and each debtor becomes liable only for his share.'7 The effect of this
10. The texts of Civil Code articles 2096 & 2097 (1825) are identical to those of OA
2100 & 2101. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2100-2101 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 16 West's La.
Stat. Ann.-Civ. Code).
11. 156 La. 746, 101 So. 128 (1924).
12. Id. at 752, 101 So. at 130.
13. Id.
14. See cases cited supra note 4.
15. For a good discussion of these principles, see Comment, Remission in the Civil
Law, 2 La. L. Rev. 365 (1940).
16. See OA 2100 & 2101, set out in the text accompanying note 29 infra; 4 C. Aubry
& C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais, § 298(b) at 34 (E. Bartin 6th ed. 1942) in I Civil Law
Translations (A. Yiannopoulos ed. & trans. 1965); 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil
Law pt. 1, no. 772, at 415 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959); 1 M. Pothier, A
Treatise on the Law of Obligations, or Contracts no. 277, at 235-36 (W. Evans trans.
3d ed. 1853).
17. Planiol calls this a general remission, see 2 M. Planiol, supra note 16, no. 773,
at 416; see also 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 16, § 298(b)(5), at 34.
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is to transform the obligation from solidary to joint. 8 Where the creditor
divides the debt only as to one of the debtors, the remaining debtors
continue to be liable in solido for the balance. They may, however,
deduct the portion of the obligor in whose favor solidarity was remitted.' 9
Should one of the remaining debtors become insolvent, the obligor in
whose favor solidarity was remitted becomes indebted for his share of
that portion owed by the insolvent debtor. 20
The creditor in whose favor solidarity has been established may
assent to a division of the debt either expressly (by mentioning it in
the receipt) or tacitly (by giving a receipt to the obligor which states
that it is "for his share"). 21 There is nothing sacramental about the
form in which this remission must be made as long as the creditor's
intention is clear. Where the receipt fails to reveal any such intention,
however, the obligor remains solidarily liable for the balance. 2
Remission of the Debt
In contrast to renunciation of solidarity, a remission of the debt
occurs when the creditor discharges the debt in part or in its entirety.23
The creditor may do this regardless of whether he is transacting with
one or all of the solidary obligors. When the creditor discharges the
entire debt, the natural result is the discharge of all the debtors. The
obligee's cause in remitting the debt may be gratuitous or onerous.2 4 In
18. See NA 1789 which reproduces the substance of OA 2085, 2086, 2087, and 2113.
This article changes the law insofar as it distinguishes between divisible and indivisible
joint obligations. See, NA 1789 comment (a) in 1984 La. Acts, No. 331, § 1; see also
1 S. Litvinoff, supra note 2, § 22, at 41.
19. See OA 2100 & 2101, the text of which is reprinted infra text accompanying
note 29; 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 16, § 298(b)(5), at 34; 2 M. Planiol, supra
note 16, no. 774, at 416.
20. See NA 1806 which reproduces the substance of OA 2104 and 2105. "A loss
arising from the insolvency of a solidary obligor must be borne by the other solidary
obligors in proportion to their portion. Any obligor in whose favor solidarity has been
renounced must nevertheless contribute to make up for the loss." See also 2 M. Planiol,
supra note 16, no. 775, at 416; contra 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 16, § 298(b)
at 34; 1 M. Pothier, supra note 16, no. 275, at 235.
21. Accord Baldwin v. Gray, 4 Mart. (n.s.) 192 (La. 1826). See OA 2100, the text
of which is set out infra text accompanying note 29. See also OA 2101; 4 C. Aubry &
C. Rau, supra note 16, § 298(b), at 35; 2 M. Planiol, supra note 16, no. 776, at 416;
1 M. Pothier, supra note 16, no. 277, at 236.
22. See Bank of Winnfield v. Red Bayou Oil Co., 2 La. App. 466 (2d Cir. 1925);
1 M. Pothier, supra note 16, no. 277, at 237.
23. See NA 1888-1892; 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 16, § 323, at 223; 1 S.
Litvinoff, supra note 2, § 369, at 632; 2 M. Planiol, supra note 16, nos. 604-619, 749(4),
at 329-35, 403.
24. The French call the gratuitous discharge a remission of the debt. See 1 S. Litvinoff,
supra note 2, § 360, at 626. An onerous discharge is more properly termed a transaction
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either case, the intent of the obligee is to discharge the entire debt, not
merely to divide it.
Under the old law, difficulties arose where the obligee sought to
make only a partial remission of the debt in favor of one solidary
obligor. Assume, for example, that A, B, and C are liable in solido to
Z for $3000. Since A is Z's favorite nephew, Z renounces the solidarity
in favor of A and tells him to forget about paying his share of the
debt. Z intends to leave the balance of the debt and the remaining
obligors unaffected. If Z failed to reserve his right against B and C,
however, OA 2203 caused them to be released. 25 The result is the same
as if Z had remitted the debt in its entirety.
Compare this with the situation where the obligee accepts one so-
lidary codebtor's proportionate share. Assume the situation is the same
as above, except Z now decides to divide the debt in favor of A in
exchange for A's payment of his share. Subsequently, Z executes a
receipt for A which acknowledges that A has paid "his part." According
to OA 2101, Z has renounced the debt in solido only with regard to
A. He should still have a right to proceed against either B or C for
$2000. In the absence of a reservation of this right, however, Louisiana
courts consistently have held that Z's discharge of A would result in
the release of B and C also. 26 Again, the result is the same as if Z had
remitted the entire balance.
As these examples demonstrate, the problem in remitting a debt
surfaced where the obligee desired to discharge only one solidary obligor,
yet failed to reserve his claim against the others. The obligee's intention
was to make a personal discharge to a certain codebtor, not to discharge
his claim in its entirety. This appears to be exactly the situation which
arose in Irwin and Fridge, and it is this expression of intent as governed
by OA 2203 which forms the crux of the riddle. If the creditor who
released one solidary codebtor failed to reserve his right to proceed
against the others, this right was extinguished. This was the result called
or compromise. See La. Civ. Code art. 3071 (Supp. 1984); 1 S. Litvinoff, supra note 2,
§§ 372-379, at 636.
25. See Fridge v. Caruthers, 156 La. 746, 101 So. 128 (1924). While defining the
effects of OA 2203, the court in Fridge stated:
This article of our Code is a literal translation of article 1285 of the French
Code. The French commentators are unanimous in holding that the article means
just what it says: From the fact that the creditor renounces his right as to one
(of the solidary debtors) the law concludes that he intends to renounce his right
as to all. Each of the solidary obligors is liable for the whole debt as the
principal debtor to the creditors and is only liable as surety to his codebtors,
and that is why the creditor may not discharge one without discharging the
others.
156 La. at 752, 101 So. at 130.
26. See cases cited supra note 4.
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for by OA 2203, which established an artificial presumption that the
creditor had renounced his property right in the absence of an express
reservation.2
The concept of solidarity originated as a means of assisting the
contractual obligee or innocent tort-victim in securing his entire claim
from any one of the debtors.28 Yet the operation of OA 2203 proved
to be a trap for the unwary creditor, as well as a deterrent to transactions
and compromises particularly since the requirement of a reservation
probably would not be apparent to a layperson. Many solidary obligors
were released because of this presumption that the creditor had renounced
his right. Additionally, because of the confusion created by the old
articles, many cases remained on the docket which could have otherwise
been settled or in which the creditor no longer had a right of action.
The inequity and confusion which arose as a consequence of this
riddle have plagued civil law jurisdictions for over a century. 29 But now
the drafters of the Revision solved the riddle with the adoption of new
articles (NA) 1802 and 1803.
The Revision
Old Law New Law
OA 2100. Creditor's division
of obligation as to one debtor
The creditor, who consents
to the division of the debt with re-
gard to one of the codebtors, still
has an action in solido against the
others but under the deduction of
the part of the debtor whom he
has discharged from the debt in
solido.
OA 2101. Creditor's accept-
ance of proportionate share from
one debtor
NA 1802. Renunciation of
solidarity
Renunciation of solidarity by
the obligee in favor of one or more
of his obligors must be express. An
obligee who receives a partial per-
formance from an obligor separately
preserves the solidary obligation
against all his obligors after deduc-
tion of that partial performance.
27. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 707 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1983). But cf.
Cowley Corp. v. Shreveport Packing Co., 440 So. 2d 1345, 1351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983)
("While the remission of a debt cannot be revoked by the creditor, remission is never
presumed unless it clearly appears that the creditor intended it."); Meadow Brook Nat'l
Bank v. Massengill, 285 F. Supp. 55, 58 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 427 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.
1970) ("One is not presumed to waive his rights against debtors in solido unless such
intent is clearly manifested.").
28. For a cursory review of the development of this concept, see Comment, Prescribing
Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemma, 41 La. L. Rev. 659, 663 (1981).
29. See Irwin v. Scribner, 15 La. Ann. 583 (1860); 1 M. Pothier, supra note 16, no.
278, at 239.
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The creditor, who receives sepa-
rately the part of one of the debt-
ors, without reserving in the receipt
the debt in solido or his right in
general, renounces the debt in so-
lido, only with regard to that
debtor.
The creditor is not deemed to
remit the debt in solido to the
debtor when he receives from him
a sum equal to the portion due by
him, unless the receipt specifies that
it is for his part.
The same is to be observed of
the mere demand made of one of
the codebtors, for his part, if the
latter has not acquiesced in the de-
mand or if a judgment has not
been given against him.
Article 1802 of the Revision is a change in the law which displaces
the confusing wording of OA 2100 and 2101. NA 1802 eliminates the
presumption of a renunciation of solidarity in favor of a solidary obligor
who partially performs, unless a receipt specifies that it is for his portion.
This is consonant with the principle that a party should not be presumed
to have given up a right in the absence of a clear intent to do so.30
The first sentence of NA 1802, while explaining that the renunciation
must be express, should not be taken to imply that it must be made
in solemn form.3 A tacit remission by the giving of a receipt specifying
that the obligor has performed "his part" would be a clear expression
of the obligee's intent sufficient to renounce solidarity.3 2 The remaining
obligors continue to be solidarily liable for the balance.
The second sentence contemplates the situation where the obligee
receives the partial performance of a still undivided debt. In the absence
of an express renunciation, all of the obligors remain solidarily liable
for the balance after deducting the partial performance-regardless of
whether the partial performance equaled the performing obligor's portion
or was less or more than that portion.33 Should one of the solidary
30. See 1 M. Pothier, supra note 16, no. 277, at 237.
31. See NA 1802, comment (b). Cf. Baldwin v. Gray, 4 Mart. (n.s.) 192 (1826).
32. Baldwin v. Gray, 4 Mart. (n.s.) 192, 194-95 (1826); Benton v. Roberts, I Rob.
101, 105 (La. 1841); see also NA 1802, comment (b).
33. See I M. Pothier, supra note 16, no. 277, at 237, where the author states:
When the creditor has given one of his debtors in solido an acquittance purely
and simply for a certain sum, which is precisely the amount for which he is
liable with respect to his codebtors, without expressing that it is for his part,
19851
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obligors prove insolvent, the others must make up his share regardless
of any division of the debt in their favor. Although there are conflicting
views on this point, this seems to be the most equitable solution since
the law should not deter the obligee from dividing the debt.34
Assume again that A, B, and C are liable in solido to Z for $3000.
A tenders $1000 to Z. Under the new law, A is still solidarily liable
for the balance, unless Z gives him a receipt which expressly mentions
the renunciation of solidarity or which states that his payment is "for
his part." Z separately preserves the solidary obligation against B and
C without the necessity of an express reservation. Under the old law,
as interpreted by our courts, unless Z expressly reserved the debt in
solido against B and C, he could lose $2000. In the absence of such a
reservation, Louisiana courts had presumed that the obligee intended to
discharge all of the solidary obligors despite his pleas to the contrary. 3
It seems clear that in many cases, the obligee intended only to divide
the debt and receive the performance of one obligor, while reserving
his claim for the balance of the debt in solido against the remaining
obligors.
Old Law New Law
OA 2203. Remission as to one
codebtor in solido
The remission or conventional
discharge in favor of one of the
codebtors in solido, discharges all
others, unless the creditor has ex-
pressly reserved his right against the
latter
In the latter case, he can not
claim the debt without making a
deduction of the part of him to
whom he has made the remission.
The first paragraph of NA 1803
NA 1803. Remission of debt to
or transaction or compromise with
one obligor
Remission of debt by the ob-
ligee in favor of one obligor, or a
transaction or compromise between
the obligee and one obligor, ben-
efits the other solidary obligors in
the amount of the portion of that
obligor
Surrender to one solidary ob-
ligor of the instrument evidencing
the obligation gives rise to a pre-
sumption that the remission of debt
was intended for the benefit of all
the solidary obligors.3 6
contains one of the most dramatic
changes in the law incorporated into the Revision. It establishes that
the gratuitous remission of the debt in favor of one solidary obligor
is the creditor presumed to have released his right of solidity? I think it ought
not to be so presumed . ...
34. For conflicting views, see authorities cited supra note 20.
35. See cases cito supra note 4.
36. The second paragraph of this article reproduces the substance of OA 2200. It
does not appear to change the law since it is doubtful that the legislature intended to
create an irrebutable presumption in this provision by the elimination of the phrase: "But
proof may be adduced to the contrary."
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does not extinguish the entire debt, but merely reduces the solidary
obligation by the remitted share. No particular form is required for a
remission to be effective.3 7 The authentic act requirement for donations
inter vivos is not necessary when the donation takes the form of a
remission of a debt. 38
The result is the same where the obligee compromises his claim with
one of the solidary obligors. The remaining debtors continue to be liable
for the balance after deducting the virile share of the released debtor.3 9
The wording of the first paragraph clearly indicates that although
there has been a remission or compromise in favor of one solidary
obligor, the creditor need make no express reservation in order to retain
his rights against the others. This is the antithesis of the first paragraph
of OA 2203 and the 150 years of corresponding jurisprudence. This
article eliminates the uncertainty which arose where the obligee discharged
one solidary obligor without an express reservation of his rights against
the other solidary obligors. Under the old law, Louisiana courts declined
to distinguish between the situation where the obligee intended a ren-
unciation of solidarity in exchange for the proportionate share of one
solidary codebtor and the situation where he intended a remission of
the entire debt.
Using the previous example, assume again that A, B, and C are
solidarily liable to Z for $3000. A is still Z's favorite nephew, so Z
settles for $400 as A's portion of the debt. Does Z still have any rights
against B and C? Under the new law, Z may proceed against either B
or C for $2000. These remaining solidary obligors benefit from the
partial remission in the amount of A's portion ($1000).40 Under the old
law, however, B and C would have been discharged along with A if Z
had been unaware of the necessity of an express reservation.
Specificity of the Receipt
While the new law will remedy much of the confusion of the past,
difficulties remain when one of the solidary obligors is insolvent. 4' The
37. There is nothing sacred about the form in which a remission must be made. See
Gulf States Fin. Corp. v. Moses, 56 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951); see also 4 C.
Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 16, § 323, at 220; 2 M. Planiol, supra note 16, no. 607,
at 330; 1 S. Litvinoff, supra note 2, § 371, at 634. It has been held, however, that where
the remission of the debt involves a disposition mortis causa, it is ineffective unless the
requisite testamentary form has been observed. See Succession of Mathews, 158 So. 233
(La. App. Orl. 1935).
38. See 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 16, § 323, at 222-23; 2 M. Planiol, supra
note 16, no. 608, at 331; 1 S. Litvinoff, supra note 2, § 371, at 634-35.
39. Cf. Landry v. NOPSI, 177 La. 105, 147 So. 698 (1933); Middleton v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 34 So. 2d 271 (La. App. Orl. 1948).
40. Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Palermo, 30 So. 2d 228 (La. App. Orl. 1947).
The settlement inures to the benefit of the codebtor whose debt was reserved.
41. For an excellent discussion on the effects of the insolvency of a solidary obligor,
see Chamallas, Comparative Fault and Multiple Party Litigation in Louisiana: A Sampling
of the Problems, 40 La. L. Rev. 373, 387-96 (1980).
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second sentence of NA 1806 states that any debtor in whose favor
solidarity has been renounced must nevertheless contribute his portion
when there is an insolvent among the remaining debtors. 42 Meanwhile,
comment (d) to NA 1803 states: "In case of insolvency of a solidary
obligor after the obligee has remitted the debt in favor of another, the
loss must be borne by the obligee." ' 43 Difficulties will arise because,
logically, any partial remission of the debt in favor of one solidary
obligor must necessarily involve a division of the debt as well. The
obligee can not release one solidary obligor for his portion, with the
intent of retaining his claim for the balance, unless he first renounces
solidarity as to that obligor. Otherwise, the obligee would be remitting
the entire debt. Thus, the partial remission in favor of one solidary
obligor is a two-step process.
Though not as harsh, this could also prove to be a trap for the
unwary creditor. While neither a renunciation of solidarity nor a re-
mission of the debt need be made in solemn form, it is still crucial
that the obligee clearly specify his intent in any type of release given
to a solidary obligor. 44 Using the same example as above, A approaches
Z and offers to pay his virile share if Z will agree to renounce solidarity
in A's favor. Z, who sincerely desires to recover the total debt, agrees
to accept A's proportionate share. To insure a complete recovery, Z
must carefully word A's receipt; the receipt which Z executes in favor
of A should state that Z has merely renounced the solidarity in favor
of A in order that he may pay "his part." Any reference to releasing
A from any further liability must be avoided in order for A to remain
liable for his portion, should B or C prove insolvent, since comment
(d) to NA 1803 would place a loss due to insolvency upon Z. If the
court is unable to perceive clearly the intent of the obligee, it could
presume that the creditor intended a final discharge of the obligor in
whose favor solidarity was renounced. 45
Assume now that Z wants to make a partial remission of the debt
in favor of his nephew A. Z executes a receipt in favor of A which
states that A is released form all further liability. Under the new law,
Z no longer need make an express reservation of his claim against B
and C. Should B prove insolvent, however, Z may only recover $1500
from C.46
42. For the text of NA 1806, see supra note 20.
43. 1984 La. Acts, No. 331, § 1.
44. NA 1802, comment (b); see supra notes 37-38.
45. It seems likely that when confronted with such a situation, Louisiana courts would
be influenced by their interpretation of the old law and favor a complete discharge of
the obligor.
46. Although Z could seek the balance of $2000 against C, C would be able to claim
the deduction of A's portion of B's share.
[Vol. 45
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Conclusion
Apparently, the fundamental difference between the new and old
articles dealing with the release of one solidary obligor is how the new
articles facilitate the true expression of the obligee's intent. No longer
is an affirmative act on the part of the creditor required to defeat an
artificial presumption of the law. With the obvious exception of liberative
prescription, it is generally an undesirable law which extinguishes a
person's property right in the absence of an affirmative act on his part.
Such a law would be contrary to the principle that no one is presumed
to give up a right. The solidarity which was established to strengthen
the obligee may now fulfill its purpose without at the same time placing
the obligee in a precarious situation. Our legislators and drafters have
taken a giant step toward injecting clarity and consistency in the law,
where confusion and uncertainty once prevailed.
Mark C. Dodart

